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By
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ABSTRACT
Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR) provides a framework for measuring and
understanding factors that contribute to information risk. One such factor is FAIR
Vulnerability; the probability that an event involving a threat will result in a loss. An
asset is vulnerable if a threat actor’s Threat Capability is higher than the Resistance
Strength of the asset. In FAIR scenarios, Resistance Strength is currently estimated for
entire assets, oversimplifying assets containing individual systems and the surrounding
environment. This research explores enhancing estimations of FAIR Vulnerability by
modeling interactions between threat actors and assets through attack graphs. By
breaking down the scenario into more representative and quantifiable parts, more detailed
and precise analyses are possible.
Keywords—Factor Analysis of Information Risk; Attack Graphs; Resistance Strength;
Vulnerability;
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DETERMINING VULNERABILITY USING ATTACK GRAPHS:
AN EXPANSION OF THE CURRENT FAIR MODEL
Beth Anderson
Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR) [1] provides the ability to understand
and quantify risk and the components that comprise it. FAIR breaks from traditional risk
assessments where risk is measured with qualitative ratings such as high, medium and
low. Instead, FAIR provides a model to quantify risk into dollars and cents. FAIR
accomplishes this by breaking down risk into understandable measurable components
that combine in the FAIR ontology. However, there is still work to be done to develop
FAIR into a more realistic and robust ontology. One component within the FAIR
ontology, Vulnerability, lacks a realistic estimation model that captures the complexities
of networks surrounding assets, vulnerabilities, and other nuances. This research expands
upon the current FAIR model to address limitations of FAIR Vulnerability by expanding
the ontology to include attack graphs.
This paper is structured as follows: To begin, the current FAIR model is explained
and areas for improvement within FAIR Vulnerability are highlighted. Then, a solution to
limitations of FAIR Vulnerability is presented, followed by a description of attack graphs
and vulnerabilities. Following that, an example network is introduced, the corresponding
attack graph analyzed, and FAIR is applied to exploratory scenarios using this network.
Finally, future work is discussed, and the paper concludes.
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1. FACTOR ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION RISK
Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR) [1] places risk into an ontology
(Figure 1) where lower components combine together to determine higher components
until the root of the ontology, Risk, is determined. Each factor within the FAIR ontology
represents a probability distribution [1]. Components lower in the ontology are defined
using minimum, most likely, and maximum. By estimating values of measurable
components, probabilities that are difficult or impossible to measure can be determined
using the probability distributions of measurable components further down the ontology.
The FAIR ontology is used bottom up, where measurements are provided at more
granular components at the bottom and then combined to determine components higher
up the ontology. However, when explaining structure of the FAIR ontology, it is easiest
to explain from the top down, starting with Risk and breaking it down into smaller
components.
1.1 Risk

Figure 1. FAIR Ontology [1]
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Within FAIR, Risk defined as “the probable frequency and probable magnitude of
a future loss” [1]. Risk is the combination of how likely it is that a loss will occur (Loss
Event Frequency) and how much is likely to be lost (Loss Magnitude). These two
components, Loss Event Frequency and Loss Magnitude comprise the first layer of the
FAIR ontology and are the direct descendants of Risk.
1.2 Loss Magnitude and Subcomponents
Loss Magnitude represents the magnitude of incurred loss — i.e. how much loss
is likely to result. This is measured in currency units, such US dollars, or Euros, and is
related to the asset, the thing of value. The more valuable the asset is, the larger Loss
Magnitude is likely to be. Loss Magnitude is defined as “the probable magnitude of
primary and secondary loss resulting from an event” [1]. However, determining a
probability distribution for the entirety of Loss Magnitude is difficult as there are many
different factors that determine how much money will be lost. Because of this, Loss
Magnitude is broken down into two subcomponents: Primary and Secondary Loss.
Primary Loss is “primary stakeholder loss that materializes directly as a result of
the event” [1]. Primary Loss is measurable as companies can determine how much money
it will take to get operations back up and running, as well as how much an asset is worth.
Examples of Primary Loss include: lost revenue from outages, wages paid to workers
when work is not being completed, and replacement of tangible assets such as cash. This
node is represented by a probability distribution with values for the minimum, most
likely, and maximum amount of money that would be directly lost due to a loss event.
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Secondary Loss is the other component that comprises Loss Magnitude.
Compared to Primary Loss, Secondary Loss is the fallout of the event rather than the
direct result [1]. Examples of Secondary Loss include results from reputation loss, fines,
and judgements. Secondary Loss is more nuanced than Primary Loss and is more difficult
to measure. Because of this, Secondary Loss is broken down further into Loss Event
Frequency and Loss Magnitude in the same way that Risk is broken down at the top on
the ontology. Secondary Loss Event Frequency is defined as “the percentage of primary
events that have secondary effect” [1]. As not all scenarios have the potential for
Secondary Loss; it is important to measure how often the primary event will result in a
secondary event. Secondary Loss Events can include fines and judgements being levied
because of negligence. The other half of Secondary Loss is Secondary Loss Magnitude,
the “loss associated with secondary stakeholder reactions” [1]. This would include
notification cost, credit monitoring, legal defense costs, and diminished stock prices.
Measurements taken on Secondary Loss Event Frequency and Secondary Loss
Magnitude are combined to create a probability distribution that represents Secondary
Loss. The probability distribution of Secondary Loss is then combined with the
distribution representing Primary Loss to determine Loss Magnitude, the amount of
damage an event could inflict.
1.3 Loss Event Frequency and Subcomponents
Where Loss Magnitude tells us how much can be lost, Loss Event Frequency is
how frequent a loss is expected to happen, often measured in events per period such as
twice per year. It is important to note that Loss Event Frequency is how often an event
completely comes to fruition, not how frequently an event is attempted. For example,
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Loss Event Frequency would measure how often a hacker successfully infiltrates a
database (once a year) not how often hackers attempt to infiltrate (many times a day). In
the same way that Loss Magnitude is further broken down into more understandable and
measurable components, so is Loss Event Frequency. Loss Event Frequency is comprised
of Threat Event Frequency and Vulnerability.
Threat Event Frequency is the “probable frequency, within a given time-frame,
that threat agents will act in a manner that may result in loss” [1]. Threat Event
Frequency includes all potential events including those that result in loss as measured by
Loss Event Frequency and those that do not. In the earlier example, Threat Event
Frequency is how often hackers tried to infiltrate the database, which may be many times
a day. In this case, the probability distribution can be decided at the Threat Event
Frequency level. If there are logs that measure how often threat actors attack, there is no
need to measure at lower levels of the ontology. However, there are some situations
where measuring at Threat Event Frequency is difficult. Thus, Threat Event Frequency is
broken down into two other components, Contact Frequency and Probability of Action.
Contact Frequency is “the probable frequency, within a given time-frame, that
threat agents will come into contact with assets” [1]. A threat agent is anything that can
cause a loss event, from a hacker to a tornado. Contact Frequency includes both logical
contact, such as a scan of a web server, or physical contact, such as an employee stealing
sensitive documents. Several types of contact include a threat agent randomly
encountering an asset, contact during regular business activities, or a threat agent
purposeful contacting an asset. It is useful to measure at Contact Frequency if there is an
asset that is contacted for reasons other than the loss event. For example, having a
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database manager access the database to check logs every day would be a type of contact.
However, it is unlikely that each time the manager accesses the logs is a loss event.
Contact happens all the time; what determines if an event becomes a threat is the
Probability of Action. Probability of Action is “the probability that a threat agent will act
upon an asset once contact has occurred” [1]. Once contact has been made, there is a
probability that the threat agent will or will not do something negative to the asset. In the
example of Contact Frequency mentioned earlier, a database manager is checking the
daily logs, meaning that he or she has access to information about the database. The
Probability of Action would measure if he or she attempts to do damage to the database,
whether it be to breech confidentiality or degrade the integrity of the data. Most of the
time, Probability of Action in this case would be near 0%. Unless the employee is
disgruntled, the chances of them doing anything negative during these checks is small.
On the other hand, a hacker purposely contacting a web server would have a Probability
of Action of a 100%. The combination of how often an asset is contacted and the
probability that action will be taken upon contact determines Threat Event Frequency.
Loss Event Frequency is comprised of both Threat Event Frequency, made of
Contact Frequency and Probability of Action, and Vulnerability. Even if the Threat Event
Frequency of an asset is high, with events happening constantly, this does not mean that
the asset will have high Loss Event Frequency, the frequency that something damaging
has happened. This is because not every attempt at an asset is successful. Vulnerability is
the probability that an event involving a threat will result in a loss. Note that this
definition of vulnerability is different from typical definitions of vulnerability. When
speaking of vulnerability as defined by FAIR, “FAIR Vulnerability” will be used. When
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speaking of vulnerability as a flaw in the defenses of an asset, such as an exploitable
software bug, “vulnerability” will be used. FAIR Vulnerability is “the probability that a
threat agent’s actions will result in a loss” [1]. FAIR Vulnerability is further broken down
into Threat Capability and Resistance Strength.
Threat Capability is the level of ability of the threat actor measured on a
percentile scale from 0-100. Threat Capability is determined based on a population of
threat actors also known as a threat community. For example, the probability distribution
for the Threat Capability of Cyber Criminals may place the least capable threat actor in
the 60th percentile, the most capable actor at the 100th percentile, and a majority of threat
actors within the 90th percentile [1]. The rationale behind this measurement is that Cyber
Criminals are more skilled and have better resources than an average cyber threat agent.
Threat Capability is directly compared against Resistance Strength to determine FAIR
Vulnerability.
The Resistance Strength of an asset is measured on the same scale as Threat
Capability. Resistance Strength is defined as “the level of difficulty that a threat agent
must overcome” [1]. This could be how strong the brick and mortar of a house is against
a hurricane or how advanced an anti-virus software is against malicious software. The
Resistance Strength of an asset is how capable the asset protects itself against threats.
Being on the same scale as Threat Capability, Resistance Strength is directly compared to
Threat Capability. If Threat Capability is higher than Resistance Strength, the threat event
would become a loss event – i.e. The threat actor would successfully complete his or her
goal. If Resistance Strength is higher than Threat Capability, then the asset is safe, and no
loss would occur.
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Measurements of Resistance Strength and Threat Capability are combined to
determine FAIR Vulnerability. Threat Event Frequency can be broken down into Contact
Frequency and Probability of Action or measured directly at Threat Event Frequency.
The probability distribution resulting from the combinations of Threat Event Frequency
and FAIR is Loss Event Frequency which combined with Loss Magnitude quantifies
Risk.

2. PROBLEMS WITH FAIR VULNERABILITY
The current method of determining FAIR Vulnerability has room for
improvement. The current estimation model for FAIR Vulnerability as described by an
industry expert [2] places the burden of estimating Resistance Strength on the analyst
who must determine values for minimum, maximum and most likely, for the Resistance
Strength of the entire asset. For example, if an analyst discovers that an asset has a SQL
injection vulnerability, it is up to him or her to decide how much impact that vulnerability
has on the strength of the asset. Introduce new analysts and the resulting Resistance
Strengths of the same asset can vary. Additionally, assets can be made up of intricate
systems and parts, all of which have their own strengths and weaknesses. An analyst
would have to determine and then aggregate the Resistance Strength of a complicated
connection of different subsystems. Without detailed knowledge of all the aspects of an
asset, an analyst cannot make accurate judgements about the asset’s Resistance Strength.
Furthermore, assets can live within larger systems where threats can elevate privileges
outside of the asset, allowing access to the asset that would be difficult to model through
FAIR in its current form. For example, a web application is connected to many other
systems ranging from servers to databases. A vulnerability within any of the connected
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systems has the potential to expose the web application to attackers. Looking at just the
vulnerabilities of one part of the highly connected network potentially misses interesting
and important attack pathways. Assets are not always single units, they can be multi-layer
systems with each part having various levels of Resistance Strength.
A solution to these limitations is to create a model of FAIR Vulnerability that can
account for the complexities and intricacies of real assets. Determining the Resistance
Strength at the asset level oversimplifies highly complex assets that may be involved in
larger systems. A model that can make use of information about the internals of an asset,
or its relationships to external systems will better represent the real world.

3. SOLUTION
The proposed solution introduces an expansion to the calculation of FAIR
Vulnerability by employing an attack graph to model paths a threat actor can take to
successfully harm an asset. Along these paths, the threat actor will exploit vulnerabilities
in sequence, elevating his or her privilege along the way. However, it should be noted
that this expansion to FAIR will not fit all risk scenarios modellable by FAIR. For
example, a tornado destroying a server warehouse would not be an applicable scenario.
This expansion is suited for situations that would be modellable by an attack graph – e.g.
a threat actor is attempting to hack into a database to gain personally identifiable
information.
This expansion to FAIR introduces the idea that FAIR Vulnerability can be
improved to take into account the features of an asset. This allows for the environment
surrounding the asset as well as components of the asset to be described in terms of
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concrete components and connections via an attack graph. Using an attack graph ensures
that only the relevant aspects of an asset will be used in a FAIR scenario. There is no use
in determining Resistance Strength for parts of the asset that would not be touched within
a scenario.
This expansion can use attack graphs in two different ways. The first would be to
determine Resistance Strength for each attack step in the attack graph. These
determinations are made by analysts informed by system configuration, known
vulnerabilities, and Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) scores as well as
expertise in the asset. This way requires more input; however, this could be beneficial if
there are intricacies of the asset that are not completely encapsulated by the information
provided to the attack graph. Analysts highly familiar with the configuration of an asset
may be better able to determine the viability of an attack step than blind probability.
The second way that attack graphs can be used is with Bayesian Networks to
determine the probability of a successful attack. This would allow for the probability of
an actor completing each step within the attack graph to be determined based on the
probability of previous steps. Information such as vulnerabilities will be included to form
probabilistic relations between the different steps in the attack sequence. However, this
way does not inherently take into account differences in the Threat Capabilities of threat
actors.
The first and second way of using attack graphs within FAIR can be used in
conjunction. There is no strict need to adhere to one technique or the other. Sometimes
there will be situations where a step in the attack graph is more suited for an analyst to
determine the Resistance Strength compared to the Threat Capability of the threat actor.
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Other times this will not be needed, and Bayesian probability models the situation
accurately. The general approach of the examples within this paper is to rely on a
Bayesian network to provide probabilities that a threat actor would be able to make it to a
particular step in the attack graph but analyze and adjust the Bayesian network based on
knowledge about the model and the threat actor.

4. ATTACK GRAPHS
Attack graphs are models that represent information about vulnerabilities and
interaction in a network to show different paths that an attacker can follow to reach a
given goal. Along each of these paths, the attacker will exploit vulnerabilities in
sequence, elevating his or her privilege along the way. There are two main types of attack
graphs: state-based representations and logical attack graphs. Within state-based
representations each node represents the state of the whole network after a single atomic
attack. The number of state nodes increases dramatically as the network increases, thus
limiting the applicability of this type of graph to very small networks. Logical attack
graphs on the other hand are defined as bipartite graphs that represent dependencies
between security conditions and exploits [3]. This research uses logical attack graphs as
the size of assets can range from small networks to dynamically large systems.
4.1 MulVal
Constructing an attack graph is a “tedious, error-prone and impractical for attack
graphs larger than a hundred nodes” [4]. This tediousness can be alleviated by using tools
such as MulVal, the Multi-host, Multi-stage Vulnerability Analysis Language tool [5].
MulVal is a scalable end to end framework that models the interaction of vulnerabilities
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with system and network configurations. MulVal takes information encoded as Datalog
facts to create an attack graph. Datalog is “a declarative logic language in which each
formula is a function-free Horn clause, and every variable in the head of a clause must
appear in the body of the clause” [6].
Using the information provided, as well as logical rules defined within the
MulVal engine, MulVal creates a logical attack graph that shows steps an attacker can
take to reach a specified goal and the configurations used in order to execute attack steps.
Information is entered into the MulVal reasoning engine as Datalog facts. Interaction
rules are also supplied to the reasoning engine. The engine then creates attack simulation
traces that determine all different attack paths that could be used to reach the goal. The
trace is then passed to a graph builder which creates a logical attack graph, which is then
outputted to the user [7].

Figure 2. Graphical representation of the MulVal tool [5]
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The logical attack graph consists of three different types of nodes: AND, OR and
LEAF nodes. An AND node represents an attack step within the attack graph. An example
of an AND node is “RULE 6 (direct network access)”. This AND node is determined
based on interaction rules that are inputted into the MulVal tool as well as preconfigured
rules that are already included in the tool. OR nodes are privilege nodes. An example of a
OR node would be “netAccess (webServer, tcp, 80)”. This means that an attacker has
privileges to access the web server using tcp on port 80. The final type of node is a LEAF
node which represents the configuration of the system. An example of a LEAF node
would be “hacl(internet, webServer, tcp, 80)”, which means that the web server can
connect to the internet using tcp on port 80. All three of these nodes types comprise the
attack graph created by MulVal [7].
The following sections describe each type of information provided to the MulVal
engine in order to create the attack simulation trace and eventually an attack graph [5].
4.1.1 Advisories
Advisories relate to what vulnerabilities exist in the network. Vulnerabilities can
be determined by using a vulnerability scanner such as an OVAL (Open Vulnerability
Assessment Language) scanner or one of the many other available options [8-9]. The
original MulVal research used an OVAL scanner which uses OVAL formalized
vulnerability definitions to test a machine to see if any of those definitions are matched
[10]. The results from the OVAL scanner are translated into a Datalog fact and supplied
to the MulVal engine. An example of a Datalog fact of a vulnerability is
vulExists(webServer, ’CAN-2002-0392’, httpd).
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This fact tells that there is a vulnerability involving the server program httpd on a web
server with the ID of CAN-2002-0392. Another Datalog clause is used to capture the
effect of the vulnerability.
vulProperty(’CAN-2002-0392’, remoteExploit, privilegeEscalation).

This Datalog fact shows that the vulnerability CAN-2002-0392 enables arbitrary code
execution by a remote attacker with all the program’s privileges. This information can be
determined from sources such as the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) provided by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [11]. However, many
vulnerability scanners already correlate this data and provide information about the
impact of the vulnerability which can be fed into the MulVal reasoning engine.
4.1.2 Host Configuration
Host configuration is information about the software and services that are running
on hosts as well as the configuration of those hosts. This information can also be
determined using scanners. For example, one could use the OVAL scanner to extract
configuration parameters such the port numbers and privileges of a program on a host.
This data is converted to Datalog clauses like
networkService(webServer, httpd, TCP, 80, apache).

This clause describes a web server with a program httpd listening on port 80 using TCP
protocol and running as the user ‘apache’.
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4.1.3 Network Configuration
Network configuration is information about how network routers and firewalls are
configured. MulVal models network configurations as abstract host access-control lists
(HACL). This information can be found by looking at the configuration of network
routers and firewalls. This information is converted to Datalog clauses like the following
which shows that TCP traffic is allowed from the internet to port 80 on the web server.
hacl(internet, webServer, TCP, 80)

4.1.4 Principals
Principals refer to the users of the network and their accounts on the network
hosts. For example, a system admin has an account on the web Server with root
permission. This is written in Datalog as
hasAccount(sysAdmin, webServer, root).

4.1.5 Interactions
Interactions model how components within a network interact. General rules can
be established for the network using Horn clauses. In Horn clauses, the first line is the
conclusion, or result, and the remaining lines are the conditions that enable the
conclusion. An example of this is
execCode(Attacker, Host, Priv) :- vulExists(Host, VulID, Program),
vulProperty(VulID, remoteExploit, privEscalation), networkService(Host,
Program, Protocol, Port, Priv), netAccess(Attacker, Host, Protocol, Port),
malicious(Attacker).
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The earlier Horn clause describes that an attacker would be able to execute arbitrary code
on the machine under the privilege Priv, if there was a program running on a host that
allowed for privilege escalation, that program was listening on Protocol and Port while
running under Priv privilege, and the attacker can access that Protocol and Port through
the network. Words capitalized within this clause (Host, Program, VulID, ect.) are Prolog
variables that matched, meaning that this rule can be applied to any set of actual
parameters that match this pattern. Using the extendibility of these rules, general sets of
rules have been created and special network specific rules can be added to the MulVal
engine as needed.
4.1.6 Policy
Policy refers to access permissions on data. If a policy is not explicitly allowed,
then it is assumed to be prohibited. For example,
allow(Everyone, read, webPages)
allow(systemAdmin, write, webPages)

This policy says that anyone can read web pages and that the user systemAdmin is
allowed to write web pages. Like the Horn clauses of configuration, Everyone is
capitalized meaning it is a Prolog variable that represents any user.
4.2 Bayesian Attack Model
Attack graphs, such as the one created by the MulVal tool, provide information
about the paths that a threat actor can take to reach a particular goal. However, Attack
graphs are not well suited to model ongoing attacks as they cannot represent the
progression of an attacker through the system [12]. Adding a Bayesian network to an
attack graph adds the probability that an attacker would be reach a step within the attack
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graph. A Bayesian network is a probabilistic graphical model based on a directed acyclic
graph where nodes represent random variables and edges represent the probabilistic
dependences between those variables.
Within the context of an attack graph, nodes represent exploits e and conditions c
each of which have two probabilities, p(e) and p(c) for individual scores and P(e) and
P(c) for cumulative scores respectively. Individual score p(e) is the probability that the
exploit e will be successfully be executed given that all other conditions for exploit are
already met. This is the intrinsic likelihood of an exploit in isolation without the influence
of any other factors. The same is for p(c), but with conditions rather than exploits. P(e)
and P(c) are cumulative scores that measure the overall likelihood that exploit e will be
successfully executed or that condition c will be met. These probabilities are based on
probabilities earlier in an attack sequence [13]. Conditional probabilities are of the main
interest within attack graphs as those probabilities model the likelihood of an attacker
reaching a particular node within the graph.

5. VULNERABILITY DATA
As mentioned earlier “vulnerability” has a different meaning within the context of
FAIR. FAIR vulnerability is “the probability that a threat agent’s actions will result in a
loss” [1]. However, the definition of vulnerability within this section is a “weakness in an
IS (Information System), system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation
that could be exploited” [14]. More specifically, a vulnerability is “a specific bug in a
specific software which can be abused in an unintended manner to potentially cause a
negative impact to the user of the software” [15]. Information about vulnerabilities in
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software and hardware is available, enumerated, and cataloged though Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures, Common Weakness Enumeration, and the Common
Vulnerability Scoring System.
5.1 Vulnerability Information
5.1.1 CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) is list of publicly known common
identifiers for cyber security vulnerabilities [16]. After being launched in 1999 by
MITRE Corporation, CVE is now the industry standard for identifying vulnerabilities. A
CVE identifier (CVE-1999-0400) maintains a one to one relationship with a vulnerability
and a standardized description for each vulnerability or exposure. While CVE is a
dictionary, not a database, it does feed into NVD [11]. This database is very useful for
this work as MulVal engine needs information about the vulnerability beyond the name.
5.1.2 CWE
Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [17] is similar to CVE, except that it is a
list of common software weaknesses that can occur in software architecture, design, code
or implementation that can lead to exploitable security vulnerabilities. According to
MITRE, the difference between weaknesses and vulnerabilities is that a software
weakness is an error that can lead to software vulnerabilities. Examples of software
weaknesses include buffer overflows, authentication errors, and code injection (e.g. SQL
Injection (CWE-89)). CWE can be useful for analysts to determine the type of
vulnerability they are looking at. Seeing that a vulnerability has a CWE of SQL Injection
allows for quick understanding about what type of attack would be able to exploit this
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vulnerability. Additionally, CWEs can be used to categorize sets of vulnerabilities,
leading to further research into how the skill needed by an attacker to exploit
vulnerabilities can be related to CWEs.
5.1.3 CVSS
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) is the industry standard for
measuring the severity of vulnerabilities in software [18]. This system provides a way to
translate the characteristics of a vulnerability and produce a numerical score that reflects
the severity. Version 2 of the CVSS was released in June 2007 and has been replaced by
Version 3 in June 2015. Both version 2 and 3 are included in databases such as the
National Vulnerability Database and some older vulnerabilities are only scored using
version 2, including the vulnerabilities that were found on the Model Network.
The CVSS calculates three different scores: a base, a temporal, and an
environmental score. The base score is calculated using intrinsic and fundamental
characteristics of the vulnerability that do not change over time or in different
environments. The temporal score is based on characteristics that change over time, but
not between user environments. Finally, the environmental score is calculated using
characteristics that are dependent upon the user’s environment. The CVSS score
expressed on a scale from 0 to 10, with 10 being the most severe.
Of interest in this research are the exploitability metrics included in the base
score. The exploitability metric group measures how difficult a vulnerability is to exploit.
Table 1 describes the metrics for exploitability as well as the associated numerical value
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for each. This table describes version 2 of CVSS scoring system as the vulnerabilities
within the Model Network used in this paper are scored using version 2.
Exploitability Metric

Value

Value Description

Numeric

Access Vector:

Local

An attacker must have physical

0.395

The minimum level of

access to the system or a local

access needed to exploit
the vulnerability

(shell) account
AdjacentNetwork

An attacker must have access to

0.646

either the broadcast or collusion
domain of the vulnerable software
Network

An attacker does not need local

1.0

network access or local access
Access Complexity:

High

The complexity of the

0.35

example, an attacker must employ

attack needed to exploit
the vulnerability

Specialized accesses conditions. For

DNS hijacking.
Medium

Somewhat specialized access

0.61

conditions. For example,
information must be gathered before
the attack

Authentication:

Low

No specialized access conditions

0.71

Multiple

An attacker must authenticate two

0.45

The number of times an
attacker must
authenticate to exploit a

or more times
Single

An attacker must authenticate once

0.56

None

Authentication is not needed

0.704

vulnerability
Table 1. Exploitability metric details [19]
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5.2 Application of Vulnerabilities
Understanding the severity of a vulnerability allows for informed decisions to be
made about how a vulnerability will impact FAIR vulnerability. Previous research [20]
demonstrates a way to determine the effort and skill that a threat actor would need to
possess to successfully exploit a vulnerability. This is based on the exploitability metric
group of CVSS scores described earlier. One important thing to note is that CVSS base
scores of vulnerabilities are calculated independently. However, in an attack graph,
vulnerabilities are not in isolation. Because of this, the base CVSS score in some
situations is not accurate.
An example of the base CVSS score not being accurate would be two
vulnerabilities that exist on two separate hosts connected to each other (Figure 3). Host 1
is connected to the internet, where the attacker is residing, as well as Host 2 with
firewalls between both. Host 2 is only connected to Host 1. Both Host 1 and Host 2 have
one vulnerability, Vuln 1 and Vuln 2 respectively. The first vulnerability, Vuln 1, present
on Host 1, when successfully exploited allows an attacker to gain access to the local
network of Host 2. Vuln 2, which is present on Host 2 has a base Access Vector metric of
AdjacentNetwork. However, within this example, because a threat actor can gain access
to the local network of Host 2 using Vuln 1, the Access Vector of Vuln 2 should be
changed from AdjacentNetwork to Network. Changing this metric would increase the
overall score of the vulnerability. The dependent relationships of vulnerabilities need to
be taken into account when determining the Resistance Strength of an asset.
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Figure 3. Example network with 2 vulnerabilities

Once new base metrics of each vulnerability within the attack graph have been
determined, the effort and skill needed to exploit a vulnerability can be calculated. This is
calculated by using the Access Vector ([AV]), Access Complexity ([AC]), and
Authentication ([Au]). Equation 1 shows how to calculate both the effort score (es(e))
and the skill score (ss(e))

𝑒𝑠(𝑒) & 𝑠𝑠(𝑒) =

0.6395
− 0.2794
[𝐴𝑉] ∗ [𝐴𝐶] ∗ [𝐴𝑢]

Equation 1.

The larger the score is, the more effort or skill is required to successfully exploit
the vulnerability. This scoring system has been found to accurately match the success
rates of simulated attacks [20]. The skill score required by a threat actor can theoretically
be mapped directly to Threat Capability, as Threat Capability is the skill of the threat
actor. However, in a broader sense, Threat Capability also includes the time and
resources that a threat actor has access to. This means that Threat Capability also includes
the effort that a threat actor is willing to go through to achieve a goal. The distinction
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between skill and effort of the threat actor in relation to Threat Capability is a subject that
calls for further discussion and inquiry beyond the scope of this paper. However, within
the context of this paper, effort and skill will be used interchangeably.
6. MODEL NETWORK
As a proof of concept that attack graphs can add value to FAIR Analyses, a
simple model network [5, 21-22] is used as an example (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Model Network

6.1 Description of Model Network
This Model Network has three zones: internet, dmz, and internal, separated by
two firewalls. The network also has 3 hosts: a web server named webServer located
within the dmz zone, a workstation named workStation, and a file server named
fileServer, both of within internal. All three of these hosts are managed by administrators
using the username root. Users, modeled as a single user with the username userAccount,
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have access to workStation, which is many different machines. These many workstations
run the same software configuration maintained as a collection of application binaries on
the file server and are treated as a single entity. The binaries for the workstations are
exported from ‘export/share’ through NFS from the file server. The file server also
exports ‘/export/www/’ to the web server.
The MulVal tool also includes a scanner that detects vulnerabilities. The scanner
found CVE-2002-0392 and CAN-2003-0252, which has been upgraded to CVE-20030252. CVE-2002-0392 on the web server and CVE-2003-0252 on the file server of the
Model Network. Both vulnerabilities can result in privilege escalation and are remotely
exploitable. Table 2 describes the two found vulnerabilities and their characteristics.
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CVE-2002-0392

CVE-2003-0252

Location

webServer

fileServer

Description

Off-by-one error in the xlog
function of mountd in the Linux
NFS utils package (nfs-utils)
before 1.0.4 allows remote
attackers to cause a denial of
service and possibly execute
arbitrary code via certain RPC
requests to mountd that do not
contain newlines.

Access Vector

Apache 1.3 through
1.3.24, and Apache 2.0
through 2.0.36, allows
remote attackers to cause
a denial of service and
possibly execute arbitrary
code via a chunk-encoded
HTTP request that causes
Apache to use an incorrect
size.
Network

Access Complexity

Low

Low

Authentication

None

None

Confidentiality

Partial

Complete

Integrity

Partial

Compete

Availability

Partial

Complete

CVSS v2.0 Base Score

7.5 (High)

10.0 (High)

Additional

-

-

Information

-

-

Provides unauthorized
access
Allows unauthorized
disclosure of
information
Allows disruption of
service

Table 2. Descriptions of the two found vulnerabilities [23-24]

Network

-

Provides administrator
access
Allows unauthorized
disclosure of information
Allows disruption of service

26
6.2 Creation of the Attack Graph
The primary concern within the Model Network is a remote attacker infiltrating
the system. Therefore, a reasonable goal for this scenario would be a remote attacker
executing arbitrary code on one of the hosts within the network. For this example, the
goal of the attacker will be to execute code on the workstation. The attacker is located
outside of the network on the internet. To achieve this goal, the attacker must navigate
into the dmz zone, where the web server is located and then move into the internal zone
where both the file server and the workstation are located. Once inside the internal zone,
the attacker must gain privileges in order to execute code on the workstation. This
process can be modeled using an attack graph. The previous information describing the
network is formatted and fed into the MulVal tool. See Appendix A for the input given to
the MulVal tool for this Model Network. The MulVal engine runs through the many
pathways that an attacker may try and create an attack graph that contains all of the
pathways that an attacker can take to successfully infiltrate the system and be able to
execute arbitrary code on the workstation. The attack graph produced by the MulVal tool
is seen as Figure 5 and nodes are seen in Table 3.

Figure 5. Attack graph for Model Network

27

28
Node #
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Node Name
execCode (workStation, root)
RULE 4 (Trojan horse installation)
accessFile (workStation, write, ’/usr/local/share’)
RULE 16 (NFS semantics)
accessFile (fileServer, write, ‘/export’)
RULE 10 (execCode implies file access)
canAccessFile (fileServer, root, write,’/export’)
execCode (fileServer, root)
RULE 2 (remove exploit of a server program)
netAccess (fileServer, rpc, 100005)
RULE 5 (multi-hop access)
hacl (webServer, fileServer, rpc, 100005)
execCode (webServer, apache)
RULE 2 (remote exploit of a server program)
netAcess (webServer, tcp, 80)
RULE 6 (direct network access)
hacl (internet, webServer, tcp, 80)
attackerLocated (internet)
networkServiceInfo (webServer, httpd, tcp, 80, apache)
vulnExists(webServer, ‘CVE-2002-0392’, httpd, remoteExploit,
privEscalation)
networkServiceInfo(fileServer,mountd,rpc,100005,root)
vulExists(fileServer, ‘CVE-2003-0252’, mountd, remoteExploit,
privEscalation)
RULE 17 (NFS shell)
hacl (webServer, fileServer, nfsProtocol, nfsPort)
nfsExportInfo(fileServer, ‘/export’, write, webServer)
nfsMounted(workStation, ‘usr/local/share’, fileServer, “/export’, read)

Node
Type
OR
AND
OR
AND
OR
AND
LEAF
OR
AND
OR
AND
LEAF
OR
AND
OR
AND
LEAF
LEAF
LEAF
LEAF
LEAF
LEAF
AND
LEAF
LEAF
LEAF

Table 3. Attack graph nodes for Model Network

6.3 Analysis of Attack Graph
Based on the attack graph, there are several ways that an attacker could move
through this network in order to reach the final goal of executing code on the workstation.
To begin, the attacker is based on the internet, which is represented in the attack graph as
node 18. From the internet, the attacker can compromise the web server by remotely
exploiting the vulnerability CVE-2002-0392. As the web server is allowed to access the
file server, the attacker can then exploit the vulnerability CVE-2003-0252 and become
root on the file server. Once the attacker is root on the file server, he or she can modify
files on the file server. Since the executable binaries for the workstation reside on the file
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server, the attacker can change executable programs on the workstation. If a user then
executes an attacker compromised program, the attacker would have the ability to
execute code on the workstation, thus reaching his or her goal.
The MulVal engine also implements a Bayesian network to determine the
conditional probabilities of a threat actor moving through the attack graph. These values
can be found on Figure 5 as the number after the description of the node and a colon. For
example, Node 23, Rule 17 (NFS shell) has the probability of 0.512. Based on the
outputted attack graph (Figure 5), the probability that a threat actor would be able to
execute code on the workstation, the goal of the attack graph, is 0.43. That means that
43% of threat actors would be able to infiltrate the workstation and execute code.
6.4 FAIR Analysis
Now that an attack graph has been made, a FAIR analysis can be defined.
Realistically, an organization would define the scope of a scenario that FAIR will be
applied to and then an attack graph would be created. In this case, an attack graph and
model network have already been defined, so instead, the scope of the scenario will be
decided based on the attack graph. The end goal of the attack graph, an attacker executing
code on the workstation, is not a scenario in FAIR. However, by being able to execute
code on the workstation, the attacker has compromised the integrity of the asset, which is
modellable by FAIR. Thus, this FAIR scenario will calculate risk, expressed as Loss
Exposure (how much money a company could lose), due to Cyber Criminals harming the
integrity of the workstation. Cyber Criminals are chosen in this case as they were
discussed earlier.
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Based on the attack graph created earlier, the probability that a threat actor would
have a high enough Threat Capability to compromise the Resistance Strength of the
workstation in order to execute code was 43%. This is also a measurement for FAIR
Vulnerability, as FAIR Vulnerability is the probability that an event involving a threat
will result in a loss. It is important to note that defining FAIR vulnerability using this
single attack graph increases the specificity of the FAIR Analysis. It would not be correct
to assume that this scenario would also cover a threat actor stealing information from the
file server. While an actor could steal information from the file server through similar
attack paths as an actor attempting to execute code on the web server, the attack graph
was created with the latter goal and the probability reflects that particular goal, not all
goals. To reflect this, the scope of the scenario should be updated to represent the risk of
Cyber Criminals harming the integrity of the workstation by executing arbitrary code on
the workstation.
There are other aspects to a FAIR scenario besides FAIR Vulnerability, like Loss
Event Frequency and Loss Magnitude. Since this is a proof of concept, much of this
information is unavailable and estimates are used instead. The Threat Event Frequency of
Cyber Criminals attempting to comprise the integrity of the workstation within this
scenario is estimated at a minimum of once per year, a maximum of 10 times per year
with a most likely of 5.5 times per year. This Threat Effect Frequency may be high for
this asset. From the little information known about this network, there is no indication
that the workstation stores valuable information that would be targeted by Cyber
Criminals. But for the sake of having results, (if there are no threat events, there is no
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risk) it is assumed that Cyber Criminals attempt to comprise the Model Network between
1 and 10 times a year.
As for Primary and Secondary Loss, estimations will also be used. Within
Primary Loss, the replacement cost for the asset is estimated between $100 and $100,000
with a most likely of $50,050. If the integrity of the machines was compromised and
valuable software corrupted, it may cost a large amount money to replace. However, it is
difficult to estimate without more information, hence the broad range. Primary Loss also
includes the amount of money spent on fixing the problem. Estimated, it would take a
minimum of 50 hours to a maximum of 100 hours to fix damage to the asset, with a most
likely of 75 hours. This value is multiplied by the average wage of the employee, which
is set at $60 per hour, to determine the cost of man hours if the integrity of the
workstation was compromised. Within Secondary Loss, it is estimated that between 20%
to 70% of integrity compromises would have an adverse effect on secondary
stakeholders. In this case, the secondary stakeholders could be the users of the
workstation which are estimated to have a worth of $100 to the organization. Within a
real FAIR analysis, all of these values would have defensible evidence to support the
validity of these estimations.
Now that all aspects of a FAIR scenario have been established, an analysis is run
on the scenario. Figure 6 is a graphical representation of the results of the FAIR analysis.
This shows that the potential Loss Exposure is as high as 1.3 million dollars with an
average loss of $286,000. This output was created using the RiskLens Cyber Risk
Quantification Engine [25]. The output histogram is a binning of the results of a Monte
Carlo simulation of the FAIR Scenario. An interesting feature of the RiskLens output is
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the red line present on the histogram. This corresponds with the Risk Appetite set by the
organization. The Risk Appetite, also known as Risk Tolerance, is the “the amount and
type of risk that an organization is willing to take in order to meet their strategic
objectives” [26]. Within this example, the Risk Appetite of the organization is $100,000.
Looking at the output, one can see that the Risk Appetite is lower than a majority of the
distribution. This indicates that there is more risk in this scenario than the organization is
willing to have and there should be steps taken to mitigate this risk.

Figure 6. Loss Exposure of Model Network

By adding an attack graph to the calculation of FAIR Vulnerability, the results of
this analysis are more defensible. Rather than having an analyst set the Resistance
Strength of the asset, the attack graph can show the exact path an attacker would be able
to take to achieve the goal of executing code on the workstation, allowing for a more
granularized approach to the analysis. Using Bayesian probabilities further increases the
defensibility of the results. Using attack graphs within FAIR is flexible; if there was a
situation that the Bayesian probabilities do not accurately represent the situation, these
probabilities can be adjusted. Additionally, since the asset is now situated within an
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attack graph, a risk analyst completing a FAIR analysis will also have a better idea of
what sort of vulnerabilities and configurations are important. This provides more insight
into potential remediation methods and ways that risk can be mitigated.
7. EXPERIMENTATION
Another advantage of adding attack graphs to FAIR scenarios is the ability to
experiment and adjust the attack graph based on what-if analyses. For example, removing
a vulnerability from a network and determining the new attack graph would show the
effect of patching. For the Model Network, the machines have long uptimes and any
patching would result in loss of availability [5]. Any downtime is best avoided, so the
ability to theoretically patch vulnerabilities and see the change in resulting risk is very
valuable. Within this section, different experiments will be ran on the Model Network to
highlight helpful analyses that are available if attack graphs are integrated into FAIR.
Additionally, research on CVSS scores will be integrated into the current MulVal engine
to increase the realism of the attack graphs.
7.1 Original Model Network with CVSS Calculation
In the original calculation of the MulVal engine, all Leaf nodes, including nodes
representing vulnerabilities are set with a probability of 1. This is not accurate as there
are differences in the difficulty of vulnerabilities; not all vulnerabilities require the same
level of skill of effort to exploit. Because of this, it is important to integrate CVSS scores
into the calculation of the probability of steps requiring vulnerability exploitation.
Research discussed earlier [20] was employed to calculate the skill and effort needed to
successfully exploit each vulnerability. A vulnerability found in the network is CVE-
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2002-0392, which is located on the web server. The exploitability metrics for CVE-20020392 are Network for the Access Vector, Low for Access Complexity, and None for
Authentication. Completing Equation 1 with the corresponding numerical values in Table
1, the resulting score for skill and effort is 1. 70% of simulated attackers sampled from a
normal distribution were able to successfully exploit a vulnerability of that score [20].
Thus, the probability of an attacker successfully exploiting that vulnerability is also 70%.
CVE-2003-0252, which is on the file server has the same exploitability metric, and thus
also has 0.7 probability. The MulVal Bayesian engine was adapted to allow for differing
probability of leaf nodes and was run with nodes 20 and 22 with probabilities of 0.7
corresponding to the two vulnerabilities. The attack graph with the probability scores is
seen in Appendix B.
The probability of 0.7 for both vulnerabilities is based on an entire population of
threat actors. In the FAIR scenario defined earlier, the analysis was specifically
calculating the risk of Cyber Criminals affecting the integrity of the workstation. Most
Cyber Criminals are in the 90th percentile of threat actors. This means that while only
70% of threat actors in the general population would be able to exploit these
vulnerabilities, the threat capability of Cyber Criminals exceeds the general population.
Thus, the original probability of the MulVal tool, with the probability of exploiting a
vulnerability is 1, is more similar to the actual probability of a Cyber Criminal being able
to exploit a vulnerability than the general population. However, knowing the FAIR
Vulnerability of an asset for the general threat population is also useful. Therefore, both
the original MulVal tool with the probability of vulnerabilities being exploiting being 1
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and the probability of the vulnerability being exploited based on the effort and skill score
of the vulnerability determined by CVSS scores will be explored.
The corresponding Loss Exposure of this experiment is the Loss Exposure of a
general threat population, not specifically Cyber Criminals. Here it can be seen that the
FAIR Vulnerability of the general threat population being able to reach the end goal of
executing code on the web server is 0.2953 compared to 0.43 when the probability of
exploiting a vulnerability was 1. This highlights the importance of understanding who the
threat actor is in a scenario. Within this particular scenario, if an organization was
concerned about a general threat population the average Loss Exposure would be $204K.
On the other hand, If the organization was concerned about Cyber Criminals targeting
their assets, the threat capability of Cyber Criminals on average is higher than the general
threat population, so the average Loss Exposure of that scenario is $286K as Cyber
Criminals are more likely to be able to succeed in their goals than the general population.

Figure 7. Loss Exposure of Model Network with CVSS calculation
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7.2 Remove Vulnerability on File Server from Model Network
An interesting prospect of using attack graphs within FAIR Analyses is the ability
to determine return on investment of patching vulnerabilities. To demonstrate this, the
same network as describe earlier was run with CVE-2003-0252, originally present on the
file server, was removed. Once this vulnerability was removed, a new attack graph was
calculated (Appendix C). This attack graph shows that the FAIR Vulnerability of the
asset is 32.77%. Compared to the 43% FAIR Vulnerability found when the network has 2
vulnerabilities, the FAIR Vulnerability of the asset was reduced by 10.23%. That seems
like a lot, but it is impossible to know how that affects risk without further analysis. The
previous FAIR Analysis was run with the same inputs as the original except FAIR
Vulnerability was updated from 43% as with 2 vulnerabilities, to 32.77% with just one
vulnerability. The results are seen in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Loss Exposure of Model Network with CVE-2003-0252 removed from file server

Comparing the two Loss Exposures, we can see that removing one vulnerability
reduced the average Loss Exposure from $286K to $236K, a difference of $50K. If the
patching of CVE-2003-0252 on the file server cost the organization $1,000 due to the
availability of the file server being down, this would be well worth the investment. This

37
scenario can be seen in Figure 9. If patching the vulnerability cost the organization
significantly more, then it might not be worth it as the organization is spending more
money fixing something than if a loss event was to occur.

Figure 9. Comparison of Loss Exposure of the original Model Network compared to the Model
Network without CVE-2003-0252 on the file server

It is also interesting to explore how threat community impacts this single
vulnerability’s probability. The same scenario, but with probability of a threat actor
successfully exploiting the vulnerability based on the entire threat actor population using
the CVSS score, was run. The corresponding attack graphs has the probability of the
threat actor executing code on the workstation at 0.2294 (see Appendix D). The same
scenario was run with the vulnerability of 22.94% and the results are shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Loss Exposure of Model Network with CVE-2003-0252 removed from file server and CVSS
calculation.

Figure 11. Comparison of Loss Exposure of the original Model Network compared to the Model
Network without CVE-2003-0252 on the file server with CVSS calculation

7.3 Remove Vulnerability on Web Server from Model Network
For this experiment, CVE-2002-0392, present on the web server, was patched.
The result of the MulVal tool was surprising. Patching the vulnerability on the file server
caused no viable attack path to be found, meaning that an attacker would not be able to
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reach the end goal of executing arbitrary code on the workstation once this vulnerability
was patched. This provides interesting insight that patching a single vulnerability can
render an entire attack graph useless. This also highlights that there can exist choke
points within the attack graph that every pathway is required to go through to get to the
end goal. By recognizing these choke points, particular machines and vulnerabilities can
be monitored and patched more efficiently. However, it is important to note, that just
because there was not an attack graph for this very particular goal, that does not mean
that the entire asset is safe. There could be other goals of attackers that would be used
within different FAIR Analyses.
7.4 Remove Both Vulnerabilities from Model Network
Next, MulVal was run with no vulnerabilities present in either the web server or
the file server. Similarly, to when the CVE-2002-0392 was removed from the network,
there is no pathway for an attacker existing on the internet to reach the workstation in
order to execute code.
7.5 Add Hypothetical Low Complexity Vulnerability to Model Network
Another interesting experiment is to see how risk is affected if a new vulnerability
is added to system. For this, a low complexity hypothetical vulnerability was added to the
network. This hypothetical vulnerability can be remotely exploited on the web server to
escalate privilege using the program httpd. The attack graph with this hypothetical
vulnerability is found in Appendix E. This attack graph shows that the probability of an
attacker being able to execute code on the workstation is 53.23%, when the probability of
exploiting all vulnerabilities is 1. Compared to the vulnerability of 43% of the original
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situation, 53.23% is quite an increase. This increase can be seen in the Loss Exposure of
these two scenarios. Figure 12 shows the result of the Model Network with 3
vulnerabilities and a vulnerability exploitation probability of 1. The addition of a 3rd
vulnerability into the system increased the average loss exposure from $286K to $368K,
an increase of $82K.

Figure 12. Loss Exposure of Model Network with hypothetical low complexity vulnerability

Original

Original

plus Low Complexity Vulnerability

Plus Low Complexity Vulnerability

Figure 13. Comparison of the Loss Exposure of the original Model Network compared to the
Model Network with hypothetical low complexity vulnerability.
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This situation could be seen when the scenario is using Cyber Criminals as the
threat actor, as the probability of cyber criminals being able to exploit the vulnerabilities
present on the network is near 1. However, there are also interesting implications to
explore if the threat actor is not a Cyber Criminal and instead was the general threat
population.
Using the CVSS calculated probabilities (0.7) of the 2 actual vulnerabilities, the
hypothetical vulnerability was added with the same metric for exploitability as the two
known probabilities (Access Vector: Network, Access complexity: Low, and
Authentication: None). This means that the hypothetical vulnerability also has a
probability of exploitation of 0.7. Appendix F shows the attack graph for this situation.
Figure 14 shows the results for the loss exposure of the Model Network including a
hypothetical vulnerability with a probability of exploitation of 0.7 along with the two
known vulnerabilities similarly with a probability of exploitation of 0.7.

Figure 14. Loss Exposure of Model Network with hypothetical low complexity vulnerability and CVSS
calculation.
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Original with CVSS

Plus Low Complexity Vulnerability with CVSS

Figure 15. Comparison of the Loss Exposure of the original Model Network compared to the
Model Network with hypothetical low complexity vulnerability with CVSS Calculations.

7.6 Add Hypothetical High Complexity Vulnerability to Model Network
This experiment covers a situation where the third vulnerability added to the
Model Network is more complex than in the previous experiment. In this situation, the
exploitability metrics of the hypothetical vulnerability are Access Vector: Network,
Access complexity: High, and Authentication: Multiple. In a real FAIR scenario, the
viability of this sort of vulnerability can be determined. However, without much
information, it is difficult to say if the exploitability metrics of this vulnerability could be
possible within this network, so it will be assumed that they are. The Access Vector of
this vulnerability has stayed the same since attacker will have access to the web server
from the internet via the attack graph. Adjusting metrics based on these situations was
discussed in section 5.2. The effort and skill score for this hypothetical vulnerability is
3.98, which corresponds to about 30% of attackers selected from a normal distribution
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being able to exploit this vulnerability. Thus, the probability of the general threat
community being able to exploit this vulnerability is 0.3. Appendix G shows the attack
graph and Figure 16 shows the results of this FAIR analysis. The result of this experiment
shows that risk when a high complexity vulnerability is added to the Model Network is
less than the risk with a low complexity vulnerability. That is because a low complexity
vulnerability is easier to exploit than a high complexity vulnerability.

Figure 16. Loss Exposure of Model Network with hypothetical high complexity vulnerability and
CVSS Calculation.

Original with CVSS

Plus High Complexity Vulnerability with CVSS

Figure 17. Comparison of the Loss Exposure of the original Model Network compared to the
Model Network with hypothetical high complexity vulnerability with CVSS calculation
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8. FURTHER RESEARCH
This paper is the first step in integrating attack graphs into the realm of FAIR. As
such, there is much more research that can be done to integrate attack graphs successfully
into FAIR. In general, FAIR analyses can take a large amount of time since analysts have
to determine the estimations of ontology components. Adding the time and resources
needed to determine network configuration and other information needed for attack graph
creation increases this pain point within FAIR. There has already been research on using
scanners and other tools to speed up attack graph generation [27]. These tools should be
explored in greater depth and added into information gathering for a FAIR analysis. In
addition, using attack graphs in more realistic and complex FAIR scenarios will be able
to determine how this process scales when an analysis includes numerous assets.
Research has been done to add intrusion detection systems to the Bayesian
networks of attack graphs. These networks can become sophisticated enough to
distinguish between stealthy and detectable attacks [12] and model non-perfect intrusion
detection systems [28]. Complexities such as these and other controls can be added to the
attack graph to even better represent real life systems. This also opens the opportunity for
what-if analyses to determine when adding intrusion detection systems to an asset would
be worthwhile and impactful.
One limitation of the MulVal engine is that the set of interaction rules
prepackaged with the engine are limited. They have not yet created exploit rules for
vulnerabilities whose exploit consequences are confidentiality or integrity loss [5].
Further research can expand these rules and the engine to include a wider variety of rules,
perhaps employing CWEs to characterize different sets of vulnerabilities and the attack
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pathways that normally accompany those vulnerabilities. Other extensions have been
proposed for the MulVal tool; these can also be employed to increase the modeling
abilities of MulVal [29-30].
9. CONCLUSION
Revised FAIR enhances the calculation of FAIR Vulnerability from being based
on analysts’ opinions, to being situated within a Bayesian network that models how a
threat event would happen. Revised FAIR also offers flexibility in the calculation of
FAIR Vulnerability as analysts can step in and change probabilities of nodes within the
attack graph to better reflect knowledge about the network not captured by the original
attack graph. Demonstrated within this paper, the probabilities of particular nodes can be
determined by the effort and skill required to exploit a vulnerability based on CVSS
scores.
Adding attack graphs to FAIR analyses allows complex environments and assets
to be broken down into more understandable and quantifiable pieces providing interesting
analyses and new insights. Using Revised FAIR allows analysts to conduct granular
what-if analyses to determine return on investment of actions such as patching a software
vulnerability. By running a FAIR analysis before and after removing a vulnerability
within the network, how much the risk has been reduced can be compared with the
money spent to fix the vulnerability. Additionally, an attack graph provides the ability to
model the impact of new vulnerabilities within a system. This was demonstrated by
adding new vulnerabilities of both low and high complexity to the network and
determining how this new vulnerability impact the loss exposure of the asset. Overall,
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adding attack graphs to the calculation of FAIR Vulnerability provides greater precision,
dependability, and detail to FAIR analyses.
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APPENDIX A
attackerLocated(internet).
attackGoal(execCode(workStation,_)).
hacl(internet, webServer, tcp, 80).
hacl(webServer, _, _, _).
hacl(fileServer, _, _, _).
hacl(workStation, _, _, _).
hacl(H,H,_,_).
/* configuration information of fileServer */
networkServiceInfo(fileServer, mountd, rpc, 100005, root).
nfsExportInfo(fileServer, '/export', _anyAccess, workStation).
nfsExportInfo(fileServer, '/export', _anyAccess, webServer).
vulExists(fileServer, 'CVE-2003-0252', mountd).
vulProperty('CVE-2003-0252', remoteExploit, privEscalation).
localFileProtection(fileServer, root, _, _).
/* configuration information of webServer */
vulExists(webServer, 'CVE-2002-0392', httpd).
vulProperty('CAN-2002-0392', remoteExploit, privEscalation).
networkServiceInfo(webServer , httpd, tcp , 80 , apache).
/* configuration information of workStation */
nfsMounted(workStation, '/usr/local/share', fileServer,
'/export', read).

Figure 18. Information fed into MulVal for the Model Network based on [5].

Attack graph for Original Model Network with CVSS calculation
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APPENDIX B
ADD ATTACK GRAPHS HERE

Attack graph for Model Network without CVE-2002-0392
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APPENDIX C

Attack graph for Model Network without CVE-2002-0392 with CVSS calculation
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APPENDIX D

Attack graph for Model Network with low complexity vulnerability
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APPENDIX E

Attack graph for Model Network with low complexity vulnerability with CVSS calculation
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APPENDIX F

Attack graph for Model Network with high complexity vulnerability with CVSS calculation
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APPENDIX G
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